74 6.3 – ACTION LEVERS
ACTION LEVERS
The factors discussed above highlight the challenges policy makers may face when their policy is implemented. However, Starling (1988) provides a broad overview of four “action levers” that can be used during the policy design phase to encourage successful implementation. “Design levers” are mechanisms used during the formulation phase. “Operating system levers” are guidelines put in place to guide the policy from design to implementation. “Organizational levers” pertain to how an agency responsible for policy implementation is established or restructured. Lastly, “political levers” refer to the actions taken by policy makers and policy supporters to quell dissension among opponents, such as interest groups and political opposition. This section will discuss the first two, since organizational and political levers, although not necessarily defined as “levers,” are considered in earlier chapters.
Design Levers
Two design levers are considered here: proposal imprecision and organizational simplification. Contrary to Brewer and deLeon, Starling (1988) contends that lack of clarity or precision can help a policy maker. Precise goals can centralize organizations, particularly those relied upon to implement the policy, and they may begin to consider ways to obstruct implementation if they fear favorable alternatives will not be considered. This is particularly problematic when dealing with policy that does not have much political or constituent support. Furthermore, issues that are explicitly stated will attract opposition that will likely unite around a single aspect of the proposed policy—as with, for example, the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act—to better their chances of defeating the policy. Additionally, sponsors may have a difficult time walking back a precise policy proposal in the face of backlash, public or otherwise, considering such a move would signal to the opposition that the policy as proposed is flawed, thereby providing naysayers with more ammunition when attacking the proposal.
Starling (1984) further contends that “policies should be designed to minimize the amount of human behavior that needs to be changed.” Unfortunately, this advice is challenging, given the complexity of public policy, especially considering the ever-growing administrative state. Furthermore, policy originating within the legislature is likely to include multiple agencies and agenda items, given the nature of Congress and the prevalence of logrolling.
Operating System Levers
Starling (1998) considers four actions that officials can use to assist with implementation: start-up decisions, public relations decisions, incentive decisions, and contingency decisions. The start-up period is the time from policy authorization to full implementation, or what Starling refers to as the “steady state period.” The length of the start-up period depends on the specific policy. For example, changing the structure of the Office of Veterans Affairs could be considered urgent, given the nature of veteran care in the U.S., and thus warrant immediate implementation. Furthermore, the changes authorized were relatively straightforward and could be implemented easily as long as funding was provided. Less urgent policies, such as the Affordable Care Act, could be implemented incrementally to allow time for ironing out issues that arose during the start-up period.
Starling further considers learning curves and scheduling. Learning curves are a way of thinking about agency efficiency over time. Agencies that do not undergo significant changes, such as high turnover rates or changes in leadership, can utilize lessons learned from past policy implementation to develop more efficient practices. Similarly, scheduling plays an integral role in implementation during the start-up period and can be more effective in agencies that have a clear understanding of time to policy implementation. Furthermore, agencies can consider the expected time to reach the steady state period to improve their chances of policy success. Two factors worth considering are the budget cycle and the election cycle. Policy authorization is the first step in the policy process, but policies cannot be implemented without sufficient funding. Therefore, policy authorization immediately prior to the legislature submitting their appropriation may improve the policies’ survival. Authorization given with a long waiting period before appropriations will allow political opponents an opportunity to lobby against the policy in an attempt to kill it. Similarly, policy makers must consider the election cycle. Politically popular proposals may benefit from implementation immediately before an election to give officials an opportunity to use the policy in campaign material, whereas a policy that may affect an elected official’s reelection prospects is best suited for implementation immediately after an election. For example, a majority of Americans in 2010 supported the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” a policy implemented under President Bill Clinton, but individual members of Congress would not risk political capital to support the repeal. However, Congress did support the repeal during the lame duck period immediately after the 2010 midterm elections.
Policy success also depends on public relations decisions, especially in our current age of social media and twenty-four hour news coverage. Policy makers and those responsible for implementing the policy must communicate with a wide variety of individuals, organizations, and interest groups. To do so effectively, particularly in an era of hyper partisanship, policy makers rely on elected officials and agency heads to be consistent when using talking points outlining the policy proposal. Examples of partisan policy include the Affordable Care Act, immigration reform, and changes to such social programs as Medicaid, Medicare, and Social Security. Policy makers and agency heads regularly appear on various news programs throughout the week, and particularly Sunday morning broadcasts, commenting on controversial policy proposals.
Similarly, social media use as a public relations tool has become widespread. Policy makers can use social media to advocate for policy, while the political opposition will use the platforms to condemn it. Social media allows various mediums to be used to drive public opinion and make the public aware: emotive videos on YouTube, live streams on Facebook, polls on Twitter, and memes on Instagram are all examples of platforms used to inform and manipulate the people’s views on policy.Starling (1988) noted media is generally adversarial and anti-agency.Furthermore, he argued: Exposé titillates readers more than praise. In an agency with sound public relations, this {adversarial} bias is countered with cooperation, thoughtfulness, and professionalism. Officials answer questions from the media promptly. When executives cannot answer questions for the media promptly, they make every effort to be helpful, supplying the reporter with story material whenever possible…every effort is made not to mislead reporters, even by what is left unsaid.
It is safe to say that this assumption is no longer accurate. Policy makers are quick to stick to their talking points, often ignoring challenging questions and redirecting the conversation to their views on the issue. Furthermore, the bias is no longer countered with “cooperation, thoughtfulness, and professionalism” but by policy makers and their surrogates calling out the media for their bias. Similarly, the twenty-four hour news cycle demands commentary rather than strict reporting, that is, discussing the fact and allowing viewers or readers to draw conclusions, which shapes public views on the policy. It is no secret that news outlets, in most cases, now cater to one political party and/or ideology instead of remaining unbiased.
Beyond the media, policy makers must convince other government officials and interest groups that the policy is worth pursuing. Achieving this feat relies on a different form of public relations based on strong personal relationships. Agency officials who favor the policy, unlike advocates and opponents in elected office, must build positive relationships and court those who are undecided and in a position to push the policy through the policy making process. However, as noted above, highly partisan policies may be unaffected by these relationships. Therefore, policy makers need to have contingency plans in place if the intended policy does not appear possible.
Contingency decisions require policy analysts to consider not only competing alternatives but also alternatives that closely resemble the policy initially proposed. Policy alternatives may include scaled back versions of the initial policy that may not achieve the desired result but nevertheless address shortcomings in the proposed policy. Beyond listing and considering policy alternatives, analysts can also conduct alternative scenario planning, whereby they consider future events that may result in policy failure, particularly during the start-up period. Starling suggests using four scenarios: two that are “bleak,” one that is average (or expected), and one that is “bright” (Starling, 1988).
Lastly, policy makers must consider incentive decisions to get bureaucrats to change their behavior. Policy makers can use cost-benefit analysis to determine incentives necessary for policy success. Luft (1976) contends cost-benefit analysis does not require an evaluation of monetary terms, which may be useful when considering contingency decisions, but should look at non-monetary terms instead, such as resistance to change by individuals.Taken together, the four operating levers work in tandem to achieve policy success. A long start-up period may be useful for policy that is not urgent but may allow more time for the opposition to undermine public relations efforts by policy advocates. Therefore, it is incumbent on policy makers to consider contingency plans when policy failure is imminent, as well as select the right incentives to gain support from policy implementers. The success of these decisions is largely influenced by the organizational structure in which the policy is being considered and the methods used to implement the policy.
