12.1 Cultural Influences on Morality

This lesson focuses on the cultural influences on morality and justice. In modern psychology, theorists propose that morality and the concept of justice change through personal development. Many psychologists have produced theories on the development of morality. Lawrence Kohlberg and Jean Piaget have cognitive-developmental approaches to moral development; to these theorists, morality forms in a series of constructive stages or domains. In the Ethics of Care approach established by Carol Gilligan, moral development occurs within caring, mutually responsive relationships based on interdependence, particularly in parenting and social relationships.

Some observers hold that individuals apply distinct sets of moral rules to people depending on their membership in an “in-group” (the individual and those they believe to be of the same group) or an “out-group” (people not entitled to be treated according to the same rules). Some biologists, anthropologists, and evolutionary psychologists believe this in-group/out-group discrimination has evolved because it enhances group survival. Simple computational models of evolution have confirmed this belief. In simulations, this discrimination can result in both unexpected cooperation towards the in-group and irrational hostility towards the out-group.

Morality and Culture

Morality is the principle concerning the distinction between right/good behavior and wrong/bad behavior, differentiating between intentions, decisions, and actions. Morality can be derived from philosophy, religion, or culture, or from a standard many believe to be universal; it is often part of a body of standards and principles that create a code of conduct. A code of conduct outlines the norms, rules, and responsibilities of and/or proper practices for an individual or group.

There is much cultural variation in morality, and social norms drive various behaviors. For example, some cultures approve of polygamy and homosexuality, whereas others do not. Even things that seem completely normal to us in the West, such as dancing, eating beef, and allowing men to cook meals for women, are seen as wrong or immoral in other cultures. Morals are held and agreed to by all members of the culture. In most cases, we uphold morals through rules, laws, and sanctions for their transgression. We reward people who express our preferred morality, for instance, through prizes, honors, and awards, and we punish those who violate our moral standards. We generally attribute positive evaluations to people we consider moral (e.g., trustworthy, empathetic, friendly) and negative evaluations to people we consider to be immoral (Bastian et al., 2011).

Some fundamental moral principles may be universally held by all people in all cultures and do not change over time. Starting at about age 10, children in most cultures believe in harm-based morality—that harming others physically or by violating their rights is wrong (Helwig & Turiel, 2002). Some research suggests that moral development begins much earlier. Hamlin and colleagues used puppet morality play in an experiment with infants and toddlers, which found that children preferred people who help others reach a goal (prosocial behaviors) and avoided people who were harmful or who got in the way of others reaching a goal. As early as 3 months of age, humans evaluate the behaviors of others and assign a positive value to helpful, cooperative behaviors (Hamlin et al., 2007; Hamlin & Wynn, 2011) and negative values to harmful or selfish behaviors. These fundamental and universal principles of morality include individual rights, freedom, equality, autonomy, and cooperation.

Moral Psychology | Ethics Defined (YouTube)

Moral Development

Lawrence Kohlberg’s Theory of Moral Development

A significant task beginning in childhood and continuing into adolescence is discerning right from wrong. As discussed in Module 4.3 of Lesson 4, psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg (1927–1987) extended upon the foundation that Piaget built regarding cognitive development. Kohlberg believed that moral development, like cognitive development, follows a series of stages. To develop this theory, Kohlberg posed moral dilemmas to people of all ages, and then he analyzed their answers to find evidence of their particular stage of moral development.

Before reading about the stages, take a minute to consider how you would answer one of Kohlberg’s best-known moral dilemmas, commonly known as the Heinz dilemma:

In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman’s husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1,000, half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist replied, “No, I discovered the drug, and I’m going to make money from it.” So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man’s store to steal the drug for his wife. Should the husband have done that? (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 379)

How would you answer this dilemma? Kohlberg was not interested in whether you answered yes or no to the dilemma—instead, he was interested in the reasoning behind your answer.

After presenting people with this and various other moral dilemmas, Kohlberg reviewed people’s responses and placed them in different stages of moral reasoning. According to Kohlberg, an individual progresses from the capacity for pre-conventional morality (before age 9) to the capacity for conventional morality (early adolescence) and toward attaining post-conventional morality (once formal operational thought is attained), which only a few fully achieve. Kohlberg placed, in the highest stage, responses that reflected the reasoning that Heinz should steal the drug. His wife’s life is more important than the compensation for the pharmacist. The value of a human life overrides the pharmacist’s greed.

Even people with the most sophisticated, post-conventional reasons for some choices may make other choices for the simplest of pre-conventional reasons. Many psychologists agree with Kohlberg’s theory of moral development but point out that moral reasoning differs greatly from moral behavior. Sometimes, our behavior differs from what we intend to do. In other words, we might “talk the talk” but not “walk the walk.”

How does this theory apply to different genders? Kohlberg (1969) felt that more male-presenting than female-presenting move past stage four in their moral development. He noted that women seem deficient in their moral reasoning abilities. These ideas were not well received by Carol Gilligan, a research assistant to Kohlberg. She consequently developed her theory of moral development. In her groundbreaking book, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, Gilligan (1982) criticized her former mentor’s theory because it was based only on upper-class White men and boys. She argued that women are not deficient in their moral reasoning, but that men and women reason differently. Girls and women focus more on staying connected and value interpersonal relationships. Therefore, many girls and women respond that Heinz should not steal the medicine in the Heinz dilemma. Their rationale is that if Heinz steals the medicine and is subsequently imprisoned, he cannot care for his wife, and she could die while he is in prison.

Kohlberg’s 6 Stages of Moral Development (YouTube)

Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development

Kohlberg’s scale focuses on how people explain or justify their actions, not on judging the morality of those actions. While higher scores on the scale often match with more responsible and consistent behavior, the stages are more about reasoning than labeling someone as ‘more moral.’ The idea is that people at higher stages tend to act in more thoughtful and predictable ways.

Kohlberg’s theory of moral development is divided into three levels—pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional—each containing two stages. As individuals progress through the stages, they retain the understanding gained in earlier stages. However, those at more advanced stages may view earlier reasoning as overly simplistic or lacking nuance.

Pre-conventional Stage (Before age 9)

The pre-conventional level of moral reasoning is common in children, although adults can also exhibit this level of reasoning. Reasoners at this level judge the morality of an action by its direct consequences. The pre-conventional level consists of the first and second stages of moral development and is solely concerned with the self in an egocentric manner. A child with pre-conventional morality has not yet adopted or internalized society’s conventions regarding right or wrong but instead focuses mainly on external consequences that specific actions may bring.

In Stage One, individuals focus on the direct consequences of their actions on themselves. Their focus is obedience and punishment-driven. When an individual receives punishment, they perceive that their behavior was morally wrong. (e.g.) “The last time I did that, I got spanked, so I will not do it again.” The worse the punishment, the more “bad” the act is perceived to be. This perception can give rise to an inference that even innocent victims are guilty in proportion to their suffering. It is “egocentric”, meaning that it lacks recognition that others’ points of view are different from one’s own.  Individuals defer to those whom they believe have superior power or prestige.

An example of obedience and punishment-driven morality would be a child refusing to do something because it is wrong, and the consequences could result in punishment, e.g., a child does not take a cookie because they fear being scolded by a parent. The child would apply obedience and punishment-driven morality by refusing to eat something they want because they would get punished.

Stage Two is all about self-interest. People at this stage tend to ask, ‘What’s in it for me?’ They see the right thing to do as whatever benefits them personally, without much thought about how it affects their reputation or relationships. They might help others, but usually only if it helps them in return—kind of like a ‘You help me, I’ll help you’ deal. This stage doesn’t involve thinking about society or broader moral rules. That’s very different from later stages, like Stage Five, where people consider fairness, laws, and the greater good. At Stage Two, morality is more about personal gain than social responsibility. See also: reciprocal altruism.

An example of self-interest-driven is when a child is asked by his parents to do a chore. The child asks, “What’s in it for me?” The parents offer the child an incentive by giving the child an allowance to pay them for their chores. The child is motivated by self-interest to do chores.

Conventional Stage (Early Adolescence)

The conventional level of moral reasoning is typical of adolescents and adults. At this level, people make moral decisions based on what society expects. They follow rules and social norms because they believe it’s the right thing to do, not just to avoid punishment.  The conventional level consists of the third and fourth stages of moral development. Conventional morality is characterized by an acceptance of society’s conventions concerning right and wrong. At this level, an individual obeys rules and follows society’s norms even when there are no consequences for obedience or disobedience. Adherence to rules and conventions is somewhat rigid, however, and a rule’s appropriateness or fairness is seldom questioned.

In Stage Three, our good intentions are determined by social consensus. In other words, we want to be liked and seen as good by others, and so we conform to accepted social standards. Individuals try to live up to social expectations to gain approval. Stage three moral reasoning is based on being kind, respectful, and doing what others think is right. Conforming to the rules for one’s social role is not yet fully understood. Intentions matter — if someone means well, their actions may be judged more kindly.

Stage Four is concerned with authority and is social order and obedience-driven. People believe rules and laws are important to keep society running smoothly. Right and wrong are based on obeying authority and maintaining order. There is a strong sense of duty and an obligation to uphold laws and rules. Moral reasoning at this stage would conform to the idea that if violating a law is morally wrong, culpability is thus a significant factor in this stage, as it separates the bad domains from the good ones. Most active members of society remain at stage four, where morality is still predominantly dictated by an outside force.

Post-conventional (once formal operational thought is attained)

At the post-conventional level, also known as the principled level, people start to think for themselves about what’s right and wrong, even if it goes against what society says. They follow their own moral principles—like fairness, justice, and human rights—even if that means breaking the rules. Post-conventional moralists live by their own ethical principles—they see laws as helpful tools, not unchangeable rules. If a law is unfair, they believe it should be changed. Their sense of right and wrong comes from their own values, not just from what others expect. Because post-conventional individuals elevate their moral evaluation of a situation over social conventions, their behavior, especially at stage six, can be confused with those at the pre-conventional level.

Some theorists have speculated that many people may never reach this level of abstract moral reasoning.

In Stage Five, a person’s behavior is social contract-driven. People understand that different individuals and cultures have different values. Such perspectives should be mutually respected as unique to each person or community. Laws are regarded as social contracts or agreements that help society work well, rather than rigid mandates. If a law doesn’t serve the common good, it should be changed. This is achieved through majority decision and inevitable compromise. This kind of thinking supports democratic systems..

In Stage Six, moral reasoning is driven by universal ethical principles. Laws are valid only if they are grounded in justice, and a commitment to justice carries an obligation to disobey unjust laws. Decisions are made based on what’s right for everyone, not just what benefits the individual. This involves an individual imagining what they would do in another’s shoes if they believed what that other person imagines to be true. The resulting consensus is the action taken. In this way, action is never a means but always an end in itself. This stage is rare, and even Kohlberg found it hard to find people who consistently think this way. Touro University researcher, Arthur P. Sullivan, helped support the accuracy of Kohlberg’s first five stages through data analysis, but could not provide statistical evidence for the existence of Kohlberg’s sixth stage. Therefore, it is difficult to define/recognize as a concrete stage in moral development.

Kohlberg’s stages of moral development are based on the assumption that humans are inherently communicative, capable of reason, and desire to understand others and the world around them.

Gilligan’s Morality of Care

Even though Kohlberg’s stages of moral development seem logical, they don’t fully explain how people form moral beliefs. For example, imagine a student asks for an extension on an assignment. According to Kohlberg’s justice-based approach, you’d think about fairness:

• Is it fair to other students?
• Will it create extra work for the teacher?

These are important questions about rights and fairness. But there are also other important questions:

• Does the student have a good reason, like illness or a family emergency?
• Will turning it in early hurt their learning?

These questions are more about care and responsibility than fairness. They focus on relationships and understanding others’ needs—something Kohlberg’s theory doesn’t fully address.

To fill this gap, Carol Gilligan introduced a different approach called the morality of care. Her theory focuses on how people care for others and take responsibility in relationships. She described three levels of moral thinking based on how deeply someone considers care and responsibility.  Unlike Kohlberg, Piaget, or Erikson, she didn’t say these levels must happen in a strict order, but only that they can be ranked hierarchically according to their depth or subtlety. In this respect, her theory is “semi-developmental,” similar to Maslow’s theory of motivation (Brown & Gilligan, 1992; Taylor et al., 1995). The table below summarizes the three moral positions from Gilligan’s theory:

Position 1: caring as survival

The most basic kind of caring is a survival orientation, in which a person is concerned primarily with their own welfare. If a teenage girl with this ethical position is wondering whether to get an abortion, for example, she will be concerned entirely with the effects of the abortion on herself. The morally good choice will be whatever creates the least stress for her and disrupts her life the least. Responsibilities to others (the baby, the father, or her family) play little or no part in her thinking.

As a moral position, a survival orientation is obviously not satisfactory for classrooms on a widespread scale. Classroom life might become rather unpleasant if every student only looked out for himself or herself. Nonetheless, there are situations where focusing primarily on yourself is a sign of good mental health and is relevant to teachers. For a child who has been bullied at school or sexually abused at home, for example, it is both healthy and morally desirable to speak out about how bullying or abuse has affected the victim. Doing so means essentially looking out for the victim’s own needs at the expense of others’ needs, including the bully’s or abuser’s. In this case, speaking out requires a survival orientation and is healthy because the child is taking care of themself.

Position 2: conventional caring

A more subtle moral position is caring for others, in which a person is concerned about others’ happiness and welfare, and reconciling or integrating others’ needs where they conflict. In considering an abortion, for example, the teenager in this position would think primarily about what other people prefer. Does the father, her parents, and/or her doctor want her to keep the child? The morally good choice becomes whatever will please others the best. This position is more demanding than Position 1, ethically and intellectually, because it requires coordinating several persons’ needs and values. But it is often morally insufficient because it ignores one crucial person: the self.

In classrooms, students who operate from Position 2 can be very desirable in some ways; they can be eager to please, considerate, and good at fitting in and working cooperatively with others. Because these qualities are usually welcome in a busy classroom, teachers can be tempted to reward students for developing and using them. However, the problem with rewarding Position 2 ethics is that doing so neglects the student’s development—his or her own academic and personal goals or values. Sooner or later, personal goals, values, and identity need attention and care, and educators have a responsibility to assist students in discovering and clarifying them.

Position 3: integrated caring

The most developed form of moral caring in Gilligan’s model is integrated caring, which is the coordination of personal needs and values with those of others. Now, the morally good choice takes account of everyone’s needs, including oneself. In considering an abortion, a woman at Position 3 would think not only about the consequences for the father, the unborn child, and her family but also about the consequences for herself. How would bearing a child affect her own needs, values, and plans? This perspective leads to moral beliefs that are more comprehensive but, ironically, are also more prone to dilemmas because the broadest possible range of individuals is being considered.

In classrooms, integrated caring will most likely surface whenever teachers give students wide, sustained freedom to choose. If students have little flexibility about their actions, there is little room for considering anyone’s needs or values, whether theirs or others. If the teacher says simply, “Do the homework on page 50 and turn it in tomorrow morning,” then the main issue becomes compliance, not moral choice. But suppose instead that she says something like this: “Over the next two months, figure out an inquiry project about the use of water resources in our town. Organize it any way you want—talk to people, read widely about it, and share it with the class in a way that all of us, including yourself, will find meaningful.” An assignment like this poses challenges that are not only educational but also moral since it requires students to make value judgments. Why?

For one thing, students must decide what aspect of the topic really matters to them. Such a decision is partly a matter of personal values. For another thing, students have to consider how to make the topic meaningful or important to others in the class. Third, because the timeline for completion is relatively far in the future, students may have to weigh personal priorities (like spending time with friends or family) against educational priorities (working on the assignment a bit more on the weekend). As you might suspect, some students might have trouble making good choices when given this sort of freedom, and their teachers might, therefore, be cautious about sharing such an assignment. But the difficulties in making choices are part of Gilligan’s point: integrated caring is indeed more demanding than caring based only on survival or on consideration of others. Not all students may be ready for it.

Test your understanding