12.3 Cultural Contexts for Moralism and Its Applications
In 12.1, we discussed Kohlberg’s Theory of Moral Development, with its six stages from pre-conventional, conventional, to post-conventional morality. Nucci and Turiel (1978) wanted to understand when we first develop moral concepts and conducted studies that asked children to determine whether or not certain actions were morally wrong. They observed that children’s determination of right or wrong was changeable when they related to social conventions. For example, they knew that it was a school rule that all students must wear uniforms. If told that the teacher approved of not wearing a school uniform, they felt it was okay to bend the rule. However, children felt differently about rules relating to harm, justice, and rights. Turiel found that children universally agree that it is morally wrong to harm others. Watch the video below from the 1:00 to 3:32 minute mark.
Morality: The Process of Moral Development (Internet Archive)
Turiel believed that kids naturally separate moral rules (like not hurting others) from social rules (like dress codes or table manners). He thought that moral rules are universal and based on fairness and harm, while social rules depend on culture and can change. But Richard Shweder disagreed. He said that in many cultures, moral and social rules are deeply connected—you can’t always separate them. For example, in some cultures, showing respect to elders or following religious customs isn’t just a social rule—it’s seen as a moral duty.
Shweder investigated the cultural construction of morality in everyday life. He argued that Kohlberg and Turiel’s theories of moral reasoning applied to individualistic cultures, shaped by the Western Enlightenment. Kohlberg thought that as people grow, they move through stages of moral thinking that become more advanced, with the highest stage being based on individual principles and justice. But Shweder pointed out that this model doesn’t fit all cultures. In many parts of the world, people don’t see morality as just about individual rights. Instead, they focus more on community, social roles, respect for tradition, and group harmony. This is called a sociocentric view, where the group’s well-being is more important than personal freedom (1987). He believed that Kohlberg’s model unfairly judged sociocentric cultures as “less developed” because they didn’t adhere to Western ideas of morality. He believed that moral development looks different in different cultures, and we shouldn’t assume one way is better than another.
Shweder and colleagues (1984; 1987) proposed a new model of ethics that addresses concepts consistent with the moral belief systems of many cultures and not restricted to Western values of autonomy and individual rights. Using fieldwork in India with adults and children of the Dalit class (sometimes referred to as the untouchables), Shweder and colleagues found that Western morality of harm avoidance and individual rights was insufficient and neglected other cultural definitions of morality. They noted that customary practices (arranged marriage, food taboos, menstrual seclusion) in Orissa were rooted in the natural moral order — a sociocentric view that puts the needs of groups and institutions above the needs of individuals. So, they created the Three Ethic Model of Morality.
- The Ethic of Autonomy most closely aligns with Kohlberg’s theory of morality, emphasizing harm, rights, justice, and personal autonomy. Principles of fairness emerge very early in development, before socialization influences (Wainryb, 2006; Sunar, 2018). Children in diverse cultures, such as the United States, India, China, Turkey, and Brazil, share a pervasive view about upholding fairness and the wrongfulness of inflicting harm on others (Wainryb, 2006).
- The Ethic of Community refers to being part of an organized community and recognizing your social role within that community. This ethic encompasses relationships, social obligations, duty, hierarchy, and interdependence on community members.
- The Ethic of Divinity addresses our relationship with a higher power, divinity, the sacred, godliness, and the order of the natural world.
Shweder argued that Turiel’s theory reflects a Western way of thinking, where fairness and harm are the main focus of morality. But in other cultures, morality might be more about loyalty, respect, or purity. For example, Shweder and his colleagues observed that a young widow eating fish was considered morally wrong, not because it harmed anyone, but because it violated cultural norms of purity and respect for her deceased husband. In this context, widows were expected to follow strict rules of conduct, including dietary restrictions, as a sign of loyalty to their husbands and respect for religious tradition. Western observers might see this as a personal choice or a social rule, but in that community, it was viewed as a moral violation—a failure to uphold sacred duties and social roles. It was in light of these findings that Shweder believed Turiel’s theory doesn’t fully explain how people in different cultures understand right and wrong. Meanwhile, Turiel disputed Shweder’s work and claimed that his experimental methods were inaccurate.
Social psychologist Jonathan Haidt wanted to investigate the difference between Turiel and Shweder’s theories. Haidt, Koller, and Dias (1993) conducted a study to determine if non-harm-based morality could be found in the US and Brazil across various age and socioeconomic groups. They wanted to discover if people were willing to condemn actions that they believed were also harmless. They created several scenarios in which people do offensive or taboo things, but in a way that does not harm others. Here are a couple of the scenarios they shared with participants in their study:
- “A family’s dog was killed by a car in front of their house. They had heard that dog meat was delicious, so they cut up the dog’s body and cooked it and ate it for dinner.”
- “A man goes to the supermarket once a week and buys a dead chicken. But before cooking the chicken, he has sexual intercourse with it. Then he cooks it and eats it.”
Their research found that most subjects said that harmless taboo violations were universally wrong, even though no one was harmed by the violations (e.g., the dog and the chicken in the above scenarios are both dead). Emotional reactions like disgust and disrespect were stronger predictors of moral condemnation than perceived harm in many groups. This suggests that affective responses play a central role in moral judgment, particularly in cultures or communities where morality is not strictly harm-based. Children’s moral judgments closely mirrored those of adults in their cultural group, suggesting that moral frameworks are culturally transmitted early in life. These moral judgements suggest that people derive morality from a combination of both innate intuition and social learning, i.e., that they use moral reasoning to support their emotional reaction. Haidt’s study suggested that new models for morality place less emphasis on the role of harm and more emphasis on the role of emotions and culture to understand how humans arrive at their moral judgement of situations.
Cultural Relativism and Morality
Moral or cultural relativism is the notion that moral virtues are right or wrong only within the context of a certain standpoint and cultural perspective (e.g., cultural community). In other words, what is morally acceptable in one culture may be taboo in another. They further contend that no moral virtue can objectively be proven right or wrong. Critics of moral relativism point to historical atrocities such as infanticide, slavery, or genocide as counterarguments, noting the difficulty in accepting these actions simply through cultural lenses.
Shweder’s work on cultural psychology and moral development offers a lens through which we can better understand the tensions between cultural relativism and universal human rights, especially in controversial cases. Let’s review the cases below through Shweder’s lens:
The Fatwa Against Salman Rushdie
The fatwa issued by Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, calling for the death of author Salman Rushdie over his novel The Satanic Verses, was widely condemned in the West as a violation of free speech and individual rights. However, from a sociocentric moral perspective, which Shweder often highlights in his work, the fatwa can be interpreted as a defense of sacred values, group identity, and religious purity. Shweder would not necessarily defend the fatwa, but he would urge us to understand the moral logic behind it: in some cultures, insulting a prophet or sacred text is not just offensive—it’s morally outrageous, akin to a deep violation of communal honor and spiritual order. This doesn’t mean the act is justified, but it challenges the idea that Western moral frameworks (like free speech) are universally accepted or prioritized.
Female Genital Mutilation (FGM)
Shweder (2000) critiques the Western framing of female genital mutilation (FGM) as purely oppressive and harmful. He doesn’t deny the health risks or ethical concerns, but he argues that many women in practicing cultures view the ritual as meaningful, empowering, and tied to moral values like purity, tradition, and social belonging. Shweder warns against cultural imperialism—the idea that Western norms should override local traditions. He encourages a more nuanced, respectful dialogue that considers how people within those cultures understand their own practices. For example, some women describe FGM as a rite of passage that connects them to their community and heritage, not as a form of victimization. The patriarchy hypothesis regarding female genital modification practices is overly simplistic and inconsistent with the complexities of cultural practices, as many societies that practice female genital modifications also engage in male genital modifications, often for similar social functions (Gruenbaum, Earp & Shweder, 2023).
Native American Makah Whalers
Shweder’s views on cultural psychology and moral pluralism offer a valuable framework for understanding the controversy surrounding Native American whaling practices, especially when they clash with Western environmental or animal rights perspectives. Shweder argues that morality is not universal, but shaped by cultural values such as loyalty, respect, and purity. This perspective helps explain why Native American whaling, particularly by groups like the Makah tribe in Washington State, is seen by some as a sacred tradition and by others as morally wrong. The Makah see whaling as a cultural and spiritual practice, deeply tied to identity, tradition, and respect for ancestors. It reflects loyalty to tribal heritage and a commitment to cultural survival. The act of whaling is not just about food—it’s about honoring a way of life that predates modern environmental laws. Meanwhile, animal rights activists in the West view whaling as cruel and unnecessary, especially given the endangered status of some whale species. The moral focus is on preventing harm and protecting animal rights, which aligns with individualistic and universalist values.
Shweder would likely argue that both perspectives are morally valid within their own cultural frameworks. He would caution against imposing Western moral standards on Indigenous practices without understanding their cultural meaning. This doesn’t mean endorsing all practices uncritically, but it does mean engaging with them respectfully and contextually.
Shweder’s perspective doesn’t excuse harmful practices or silence criticism. Instead, it challenges us to recognize that moral values like loyalty, purity, and respect for tradition are just as real and powerful as fairness and harm. His work pushes us to ask:
- Are we judging other cultures by our own standards?
- Can we engage with cultural practices critically without dismissing the people who value them?
